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HENRY BURNS, JR.*

"Inhumanity Into Custom?"
General Introduction
Tactics and Change-Guerilla Warfare
The continuing investigations of alleged atrocities in Vietnam brings out
a penetrating question. Are the laws of war outmoded? More specifically,
are the present doctrines sufficient to deal with the kind of war that is being
fought in Southeast Asia? Do they provide adequate guidance for this
"guerilla type" conflict? Hugo Grotius aptly states the nature of the problem: "Whence it appears inhumanity was turned into custom ... (it was) no
wonder if old men were also killed." 1 Speaking in a different age, Grotius
was commenting on Thracian, Macedonian, and Roman military conduct.
They killed women and children as well as old men, without discrimination.
What prompted his remark was the fact that the princes in command "were
never esteemed to be of a cruel nature." 2
Indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, not to mention women and
children, is abhorrent to the mind of modern civilized man. Memories of
the Nuremberg trials are still fresh. For a commander to order such
atrocities is unthinkable. For him to permit it to happen is almost as bad.
The individual has enormous responsibilities in this regard. Military obedience as an absolute duty has been rejected.
In 1804, Chief Justice Marshall laid it down as the law of the United
3
States that military orders are no justification for known unlawful conduct.
General Yamashita, Japanese Commander in the Philippines at the end of
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1
HuGO GROTIus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, trans. A. C. Campbell (London: M.
Walter
Dunne, Publisher, 1901), 328.
2
GROTIuS, 328, See also, JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME
CURRENT ILLUSIONS (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1924), 6.
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International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

112

World War 11, was executed, not for what he himself did, but for failing to
4
give and enforce orders to check excesses of troops under his command.
The basic principle of conduct is that illegal orders are not obligatory.
The difficulty of distinguishing whether an order is illegal or not may make
a decision doubtful and dangerous. To disobey an unlawful command is
lawful. However, this must be understood as being limited to those orders
plainly in violation of the well known customs of the army or laws of the
country.
Common sense would dictate that otherwise the commands of a superior
must meet with unhesitating and instant obedience. Particular cases in
which disobedience may be justified on the plea of unlawfulness of command are difficult to determine in advance. Each must be considered and
judged in connection with the necessity of military obedience. 5 During
regular war this problem is difficult. In a "guerilla type" conflict it becomes
even more complex.
One factor which enlarges the question today is the almost instantaneous
world-wide communication system. When the armies of Scipio Africanus
and Hannibal were engaged in battle, there was no network representative
with his portable video-tape record to take war back home to his viewers.
He is there today, but transmits an image-not the real war-for the real
war can only be felt. This transparent portrait is brought to every living
room. The world becomes an enormous jury.
As part of its pastime, this jury serves as "Monday-morning quarterback" to second-guess the military commanders and other decision makers.
However, on a battlefield, against an enemy who obeys no law but the law
of survival, the war is real. A potential exists for "inhumanity to be turned
into custom." There a man is judged by his peers. Those who judge are
the same individuals who contribute to his continued existence as a living
human being. The jury is local, it is competent to judge, and is representative.
Whatever occurred at Songmy village on March 16, 1968, is certainly
important. However, its meaning in terms of an evolving attitude may have
more valuable implications. A continued disregard for the rules when life
itself is at stake may lead to further breakdown in discipline. For example,
throwing away the rulebook in the interest of survival may in turn lead to it
being disregarded in the rear area where the problem of survival is not as
great.
At home, the policeman who accepts a bottle of whiskey from the store
4
5

1n Re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946).
WILLIAM C. DEHART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY LAW (New York:
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InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. I

"Inhumanity Into Custom?"

113

owner on his beat may be violating departmental rules. His knowledge that
the precinct captain enjoyed an expense-paid vacation from a local gambler
does not make his acceptance of the bottle any more nearly correct. The
same can be said for the individual who deals in illegal currency and
narcotics in Vietnam. He may find comfort in the knowledge that higher
command is condoning violations of several laws and customs. Potential
thus exists for a breakdown in the command structure.
By looking back into history today's happenings may come into sharper
focus. Alexander the Great was magnificent on the battlefield.6 Scipio
7
Africanus has been described as a greater military leader than Napoleon.
Both were successful field commanders and each is noted for fair treatment. Yet, both of these men operated under customs which permitted
wanton destruction and massacre. That was the acceptable mode of conduct. In more recent times incidents have occurred which cause one to
wonder whether perhaps the laws and rules of war have not been shoved
into the background temporarily. This is especially noticeable when the
engagement breaks down into small unit conflict or more individual type
warfare.
This discussion will cover selected historical incidents in terms of more
recent events for purposes of comparison. It will also include a brief
resum6 of some cases which relate to unlawful orders. The point is that
acceptable conduct can evolve into customary behavior. In time of war the
circumstances which can contribute the most to survival are the most
readily acceptable. It is in times like these when "inhumanity could turn
into custom," because the will to survive is so strong.
Time and Tactics -Similarities and Extremes
Alexander the Great
At the time he succeeded to the throne of Macedonia in 336 B. C.,
Alexander the Great was twenty-one years old. He died twelve years later,
having conquered the ancient world of his day. Alexander had a certain
moral quality which distinguished him from contemporaries-his compassion. He held rape and violence in great contempt. For example, upon
hearing that two soldiers had taken liberties with the wives of some mercenary soldiers, he wrote the general in command: ". . . (in the event they
are convicted) to punish them and put them to death as wild beasts born for
6

See J. F. C. FULLER, THE GENERALSHIP OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT (London: Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1958).
7
See B. H. LIDDELL HART, A GREATER THAN NAPOLEON: SciPio AFRICANUS (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1927).
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the destruction of mankind." 8 Still, war in this period carried with it utter
havoc and devastation. "Fruit-trees were cut down, cornfields were
trampled, houses were burned, every kind of wanton ravage was
brought.. ." Nevertheless, it was improper to go outside certain bounds
after the military objective was attained.
Alexander could be vicious himself if the occasion demanded. He discovered a plot against his life in which the son of a general was implicated.
The person involved, one of his own officers, had reportedly also been
involved in similar conspiracy earlier. He confessed that he had heard of
the plan, and because of his failure to report it was convicted and executed.
Alexander then sent a task force to assassinate the father.
Later, during an after-dinner drinking bout, Alexander was bitterly criticized for the deaths. One of his own father Philip's old soldiers, Cleitus,
became insulting. Both Alexander and Cleitus lost their composure. Others
in the group tried to keep them from fighting. When Cleitus broke away
from the officer who had attempted to keep the peace. and advanced
threateningly, Alexander killed him. 10
Scipio Africanus
Publius Cornelius Scipio, like Alexander, was something of a paradox.
On the one hand he would permit the ruthless massacre of townspeople
and then set free thousands of prisoners. Born in Rome in 235 B. C., Scipio
was the son of a general, and became a general himself at twenty-four.
Both his father and his uncle were Roman generals, and both were killed in
Spain. Young Scipio's first major battle was in Spain."
Massacre of the citizenry may be revolting to modern man, but it was
the normal custom during the time of Scipio and Alexander and for many
centuries thereafter. 12 The purpose was to completely stop all will to resist.
However, once the opposing commander surrendered, the troops would
stop the massacre on a-signal from their own leader.
After Scipio's first major battle, he set free ten thousand male prisoners
and restored their property. But at the same time, he declared about two
thousand artisans to be the property of Rome. He promised to free them
after the war was over if they "showed goodwill and industry in their
several crafts.'13
After the objective was secure no more killing was allowed. The purpose
8

Supra, note 6 at 56.
1d. at 63.
'ld., at 64.
"Supra,
note 5 at 1-7.
12
1d., at 37.
9

3

1 1d., at 37.
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of the massacre was plain. Once the commander was sure the resistance
was at an end, then the people were not to be mistreated.
Scipio became embroiled in a controversy about undue force after surrender which seriously threatened his career.' 4 It involved an ally. He
called on Quintus Pleminius to help in the attack on Locri and afterward
left him in command there when he had to return to Sicily. Pleminius
abused his trust. Scipio's regular troops undertook to check Pleminius and
his local force in their rape of Locri. A confrontation ensued and several of
the regulars were ordered stripped and beaten. Other regulars came to their
aid, attacking Pleminius and leaving him nearly dead. Scipio immediately
returned, held a court of inquiry, acquitted his errant commander and
restored him to command. He pronounced the regulars guilty, ordered
them into chains and prepared for return to Rome. When Scipio departed,
Pleminius had the regulars dragged before him and tortured to death,
refusing even to allow their mangled bodies to be buried. This almost cost
Scipio his command, for there were several Senators who were incensed at
the incident and favored relieving him.
BrigadierGeneral Smith

Coming closer to the present, an incident in the Philippines at the turn of
the century brought the United States Senate to attention and prompted a
resolution of inquiry.' 5 What moved the Senate is not known exactly,
however the report which was made by the Secretary of War in reply to the
resolution is thorough. It seems the Senate wanted to know the nature and
circumstances of a court-martial. Six officers, ranking from Brigadier General down to First Lieutenant, were tried by general court-martial in the
Philippines. Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, U. S. Army, was charged
16
with "Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military Discipline.'
The remainder, a major, a captain, and three first lieutenants, were tried on
similar charges, but under quite different specifications. For purposes of
this discussion the case of General Smith will be sufficient. The remaining
offenses were all of the same general nature. They involved administering
the "water-cure" to insurgents as a means of extracting information from
them.' 7 The general's offense was quite different.
14

1d., at 109-113.
15 Report of the Secretary of War, Courts-Martial in the Philippine Islands, 57th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1903, Document No. 213, 1-150.
16
1d., U.S., Congress, Senate, Courts-Martial in the Philippine Islands, 2-3.
17The water cure simply involved forcing this person to consume an excessive amount ot
water. The general practice was for the individual to be stripped of his clothing above the
waist, laid on the floor and force-fed the water. From witness accounts it was extremely
painful and usually resulted in the person "talking."
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General Smith was commander of the Sixth Separate Brigade, Division
of the Philippines. Under this command was a Major L. W. T. Waller of
the U. S. Marine Corps. Part of Smith's responsibility was the island of
Samar where a continuing insurrection was taking place. It had been active
for more than a year. Major Waller was in charge of a sub-territorial
district. He was stationed at Balangiga and operated against the enemy on
the southern part of the island. Apparently a massacre occurred at Balangiga in September, 1901.The Americans were eating when attacked from
behind "and butchered and their bodies when found by their comrades the
next day had been mutilated and treated with indescribable indignities.' 8
In the aftermath, General Smith gave an order to kill and burn, and to take
no prisoners.' 9 His court-martial followed.
Although Smith pleaded "Not Guilty," he submitted to the court a
statement of facts which is very close to the same as that outlined in the
specifications. In it he said:
...he did instruct him (Major Waller) not to burden himself with prisoners of
which he (Smith) already had so many that the efficiency of his command was
impaired; that he did tell him that he wanted him to kill and burn in the interior
and hostile country; and did further instruct him that: the interior of Samar
must be made a howling wilderness; and did further instruct him that he
wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and were actively
engaged in hostilities against the United States; and that he did designate the
age limit of 10 years, as boys of that age were actively engaged in hostilities
against the United States authorities,
and were equally dangerous as an enemy
20
as those of more mature age.

Major Waller did not follow the General's instructions. At least the
record shows that no natives were killed except during actual battle engagements. However, the report of the Army Judge Advocate General to
the Secretary of War leaves some doubt. He said that armed bodies of
insurgents were attacked and defeated, but the composition of these parties
at the instant they were attacked is unknown. He continued:
If noncombatants were present with an armed body of the enemy, the responsibility for any injury suffered by them during the progress of the engagement
rests, not with the attacking party, but with the enemy. The mere existence of a
state of war is a sufficient notice to noncombatant inhabitants to remove from
z
the theater of active military operations.2

Waller testified that "in one attack there were two children killed, but that
was because they were in a fortified place and we had to assault

it."22

1198U. S., Congress, Senate, Courts-Martial in the Philippine Islands, 4.

1. S., Congress, Senate, Courts-Martial in the Philippine Islands, 6.
Congress, Senate, Courts-Martial in the Philippine Islands, 6-7.
14.
1d., at 14.

20
U. S.,
21
1d., at
22
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Although testimoney revealed that "no very youthful men or boys" were
found among the dead, the Judge Advocate said:
If boys, under what is generally accepted by civilized states as the military age,
form part of the enemy's forces, their youth confers no immunity, and they
may be wounded or killed during the progress of an engagement
in which they
23
take part as members of the enemy's combatant forces.
In spite of that, the Judge Advocate said Smith's orders served to incite
revengeful feelings among his own troops which would "give occasion for
unjust and inconsiderate retaliation." The natural consequence would be
"to remove the belligerents further and further from the mitigating rules of
a regular war, and by rapid steps lead them nearer to the internecine war of
24

savages."

However, in the same report there are indications that the regular rules
of war were forgotten. It described the methods used by the insurrectionary forces, all of which had been enumerated in the testimony.
The dead were mutilated. A smoldering fire was found still burning around the
head of a captain's body at Balangiga. A deep face wound of a dead lieutenant
had been filled with jam. One of the enlisted men had his abdomen cut open
and codfish flour had been put in the wound. No prisoners of war were taken,
and noncombatants were put to death. Poison was used. Flags of truce were
not respected and persons travelling under their protection were killed. Personnel of these forces was composed in numerous instances of males under
military age. They were old enough to assist in the military operations, but not
sufficiently mature in point of intelligence and experience
to correctly apply or
25
even to understand the rules of civilized warfare.
General Smith was found guilty of the specification and of the charge.
He was sentenced to be "admonished by the reviewing authority."' 26 The
court admitted it was lenient because evidence showed that the General
did not mean everything his language implied, his subordinates did not
gather such a meaning, and in fact those orders were never executed.
Elihu Root, Secretary of War, transmitted the record and proceedings of
the trial to President Theodore Roosevelt. In his cover letter, the Secretary
submitted that Smith's orders were justified "by the history and conditions
of the warfare with the cruel and treacherous savages who inhabitated the
island and their entire disregard of the laws of war."12 7 In addition, he cited
as precedent an order given by General Washington in 1779.
In a campaign against the Six Nations, Washington had ordered General
Sullivan to seek total destruction and devastation. The order said "... you
231d.
24

1d., at 16.

251d., at 9.
26

Id., at 3.

27

1d., at 3-5.
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will not by any means listen to overtures of peace before the total ruin of
their settlement is effected..." Mr. Root cited also another precedent
involving orders given by General William T. Sherman after an incident at
Fort Phil Kearney (Nebraska) in 1866, much more severe than those given
by General Smith; and the Secretary recommended that Smith be retired.
President Roosevelt approved the findings and sentence of the
court-martial. He noted the "... . well-nigh intolerable provocations (the
Army) has received from the cruelty, treachery, and total disregard of the
rules and customs of civilized warfare on the part of its foes." ' 28 While the
President said that he approved "employment of the sternest measures
necessary to put a stop to such atrocities. . . " he nevertheless acknowledged the need for using legitimate and honorable methods. He pointed to
General Smith's overall record as being good, but warned that loose and
violent talk by an officer of high rank is likely to excite subordinates to
wrong-doing. In ordering that General Smith be retired from active service,
the President noted that "it is deeply to be regretted that he should have so
acted in this instance as to interfere with his further usefulness in the
29
Army."
Major Waller did not follow General Smith's orders. It is not known
why. The fact that the orders were issued is revealing. Those orders exhibit
a hopelessness and a desperation which this type of conflict can assume.
Scipio and Alexander used the massacre to insure that all resistance was
crushed. Afterward they prohibited futher excesses. In the day-to-day
struggle against an enemy who obeys no laws, the natural reaction is to
survive at all costs. Survival itself is difficult when resistance cannot be
suppressed completely. A characteristic of guerilla warfare is the continuity of armed conflict. Apparently, for the Romans the shock of massacre
eliminated the need for more force. Instinctively, General Smith may have
seen his solution as the only means left for survival.
Complications with Orders
Are They Legal?
The question of whether or not General Smith's order was legal never
was raised. However, legality of orders is important to the discussion and
will be covered briefly. Disobedience of orders is one of the most severe
offenses known to the military code. It is punishable in all armies by the
harshest penalties. Unhesitating obedience is the very foundation of mili28
1d.,
29

5-6.

1d.
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tary discipline. It has generally been conceded, however, that a subordinate
is justified in disobeying an unlawful military order.3 0 Indeed, it is imperative that he do so, for to obey may make him liable. The difficulty is to
determine the legality or illegality. Decision-making under fire with death
all around complicates the process of reasoning in this regard. Even in less
extreme circumstances, this is a most important event.
The Supreme Court Has Ruled....
Chief Justice Marshall made this indelibly clear in 1804. The case
involved instructions from the President of the United States. The Court
held that the commander of a U. S. ship of war, in obeying instructions
from the President, acts at his own peril. If those instructions are not
strictly warranted by law, he is answerable in damages to any person
injured in their execution. The Chief Justice declared that, "the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, nor legalize an act
'3
which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass." '
In the War of 1812, when a militiaman failed to report for duty, he was
convicted by court-martial and fined $96. His defense was based on the
contention that the order calling up the militia was illegal. The Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Story, held:
A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object ....
While subordinate officers or soldiers are
pausing to consider whether they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighting
the evidence of the facts ... the hostile enterprise may be accomplished with32

out the means of resistance.

Another case involved a Marine private whose enlistment expired while
aboard ship on an expedition exploring the Sandwich Islands. He refused
to respond to duty, was put under arrest and later transferred to an island
prison. Mr. Justice Woodbury delivered the opinion of the Court, holding
that:
A public officer, invested with certain discretionary powers, never has been,
and never should be, made answerable for any injury, when acting within the

scope of his authority, and not influenced by malice, corruption, or cruelty...
But for acts beyond his jurisdiction, or attended by circumstances of excessive
severity, arising from ill-will, a depraved disposition, or vindictive feeling, he
can claim no exemption and should be allowed none under color of his office,
however elevated or however humble the victim. 33

In 1851 the Court ruled that a military officer can never justify himself
30

ROLLIN A. IVES, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW

1879), p. 241.
31
Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 179 (1804).
32
33

Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19, 30 (1827).

Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 Howard 88, 129, 130 (1849).
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for doing something unlawful by producing the order of a superior. This
case involved a Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, who was part of a task force
moving into the Mexican State of Chihuahua. Traders were accompanying
the group, following in the rear and doing business with the inhabitants. In
hostile territory, one of the traders wanted to break off and "be on his
own." Acting on orders from his commander, Colonel Mitchell prevented
this. The trader was thus compelled to continue with the American force,
against his will. Mr. Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court,
holding that "the (superior) order may palliate, but it cannot justify." 34
Along this same line, the Nuremberg trials rejected the "act of state"
dogma.35 An act of a government is not considered an act of state when it
purports to authorize an individual to do something beyond the state's
competence in international law. The individual actor is responsible.3 6
Another Slant

Look at the picture now from another angle. General Tomoyuki Yamashita was charged with unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his
duty to control members of his command.3 7 As a result, they committed
atrocities in the Philippines nearing the close of World War II. The record
shows that the conflict there had deteriorated to a guerilla-type action. In
addition, Yamashita could not effectively function because of the tricky
chain-of-command structure. Yet he was executed-not for issuing unlawful orders, but for failing to prevent his command from committing unlawful acts.
All of this must make it plain that deciding as to the legality or illegality
of an order is difficult. If a questioning atmosphere should develop wherein
most orders are examined as to legality, chaos would result. In a combat
situation in which the lives of many may depend upon split-second decisions, an order must be carried out at once unless it is clearly and obviously illegal.
But what of all the rest? There are cases in which the individual has a
wide latitude. He must decide himself "how far to go." This is perhaps the
most difficult. Should a chain of circumstances incite to more violence than
34

Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard 115, 137 (1851).
35Quincy Wright, War Criminals, AM. J. INT'L. L., XXXIX (April, 1945), 265.
36
The individual cannot shelter himself behind his official position in order to be freed
from punishment. See FRED E. INBAU, JAMES R. THOMPSON and CLAUDE R. SOWLE, CASES
JUSTICE, VOL. I: CRIMINAL LAW (Mineola, N. Y.: The
Foundation
Press,
Ind.,
1968),
126.
37
1n Re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 25 (1946). See also, for example: JOHN DEANE POTTER, A
SOLDIER MUST HANG (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1963), p. 199. Also ARTHUR SWINAND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL

SON, FOUR SAMUAI

(London: Hutchinson and Co., 1968), 230.
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necessary, the individual may rationalize its use. The responsibility is great
for a young soldier. And it always is the individual who presses the trigger
in an infantry assault. This may have been the situation which bothered
Grotius-the process of "inhumanity turning into custom." Maybe that
same thing is happening in Vietnam.
38
Vietnam -The Assault on Songmy

The Situation and the Participants
It is important to get the sequence of events surrounding the Songmy
incident in perspective. First, the location has been called "Pinkville,"
"Mylai," and "Song My." Actually, the village is shown on French maps
as Truongan. The residents use that name. On later U. S. Military maps,
the name was changed to Songmy. This is the name the army is using, and
the one that has been chosen to be used throughout this paper. The
incident took place in a place known as "Mylai Hamlet Number 4." There
39
are six "Mylai" hamlets in the general area of Songmy.
The attacking force consisted of three infantry companies, each with
three platoons. It took place on March 16, 1968. The Department of the
Army received the incriminating letter from a former soldier sometime in
early April, 1969. By his own admission, the writer of this letter knew of
the incident only by hearsay. The Army began an investigation through
regular command channels immediately. Later, in August of 1969, responsibility was transferred to the Provost Marshal General. Still later, the
entire matter was turned over to Lieutenant General William R. Peers and
a group of high-ranking army officers. Peers issued a report in mid-March,
1970.
In Vietnam, the term "free fire zone" indicates an area where American
artillery and aircraft can strike at will. Soldiers can fire on anything that
moves, because the people have been warned to get out. It is assumed that
all who remain are enemy. Another term in use is "search and destroy."
The destroy part apparently resembles early Roman tactics, in that an
entire village is frequently destroyed by burning it. Describing an operation
which occurred in late November, 1969, a lieutenant said:
38

1n gathering material for this part of the paper, much use has been made of the
newspapers. Because of this, a word of warning is in order. Probably the best is one that was
used by Franz Boas, a great linguist and anthropologist. He once remarked that we could read
our newspapers with much more satisfaction if our language, like the Indian idiom Kwakiutl,
compelled us to say whether a report is based on self experience, on inference, or on hearsay,
or whether the reporter has dreamed it. Roman Jakobson, Franz Boas' Approach to Language, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AMERICAN LINGUISTICS, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 192 (October
1944).
39
New York Times, November 26, 1969, 10.
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What we try to do is to get all the people out of the village before we start
burning. Because of the psychological effect of course, they don't, want to
go-that's their home and all. So, what we do is to get them all out of the
village and out of sight before we burn it so they won't have to stand and watch
their houses burn. 40

Whatever happened at Songmy was attributable to a loosely knit unit
called "Task Force Barker." This group consisted of an artillery battery
and three rifle companies whose mission was to "search and destroy."
Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker, Jr. was in command. One of his rifle
companies was commanded by Captain Ernest L. Medina. Lieutenant
William L. Calley was a platoon leader in Medina's company. Barker's
superior in the chain of command was Colonel Oran K. Henderson, Commander of the Eleventh Brigade, a unit of the Americal Division. He had
41
been in this command for only one day when the incident occurred.
The Americal Division, itself a patchwork organization, was commanded by Major General Samuel W. Koster. The Division had been put
together in the autumn of 1967 from three separate brigades. Each continued to act rather independently until nearly a year after the incident at
Songmy. Staffing at division headquarters was thin. In the field, the units
were continually plagued with transfers of personnel to and from the
United States. With a faulty replacement system and operating in a fluid
situation in hostile territory, it is only reasonable to expect that training
was poor. Most of the troops sent into the Songmy operation were seeing
42
their first major combat.
Inconsistencies
It is not easy to piece together a logical sequence of what happened. To
indicate the complexity, one may look at three separate statements about
the artillery preparation before the assault began. According to Captain
Medina, artillery fire would "soften-up" the objective. In his briefing, he
said this would last for ten minutes. 43 Army Secretary Stanley R. Resor
said the artillery preparation was three minutes in length. 44 However, a
Vietnamese civilian who was there-on the receiving end of the at45
tack- said the artillery barrage lasted for an hour.
Much has been said about the briefing prior to the mission into Songmy.
Colonel Barker informed his staff that most of the civilians-and all of the
women and children-would be out of the village by the time the sweep
40
1d.
41
1d.
42

November 26, 1969, 10.
November 30, 1969, 1.
"The Generals Accused," Newsweek, March 30, 1970, 19-20.
4aNew York Times, December 1,1969, I.
441d., November 27, 1969, 18.
4Id., November 17, 1969, 1.
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began. He told them only Vietcong and sympathizers would remain. It was
then left to the individual company commanders to brief their own units.
Captain Medina claims that he later assembled his entire company and
told them essentially the same, but in greater detail. In addition, he warned
that they could expect to encounter the 48th Vietcong Battalion. The
artillery barrage would be followed by suppressive fire over the entire area
from helicopter gunships. Only then was the assault to take place. He told
the men to destroy the village, the buildings, and livestock. They were told
to expect to be outnumbered and "to go in shooting like hell." '46
With regard to women and children still being there, the Captain said
recently:
If I had any reason whatsoever to believe that there would be any child or any
innocent noncombatant ... precautionary steps such as leaflet drops in the
area, loud-speaker broadcasts at the same time that the combat patrol is
coming in, warning the people not to move, not to run, to assemble in a
particular area, insuring that each individual soldier knew
and understood
47
specifically that they would not shoot a non-armed civilian.
Upon landing at Songmy himself, Medina at first thought that they were
unopposed. When informed by a helicopter pilot that the company was
receiving small arms fire, he informed all three platoons by radio. He went
into the village only once, and later reported seeing 20 to 28 dead. Medina
said he believed that they had been killed by "artillery fire, fire from the
gunships or small arms fire." 48 At one point he received a radio report from
higher command which warned that civilians were in the village and some
of them "might have been shot." He was ordered to have all platoons try to
make sure they did not shoot any civilians. After the action was over, the
platoon leaders reported in the negative when asked if any civilians had
been killed. Medina said they estimated a total of 128 Vietcong killed. 49
The day after the Songmy assault, Colonel Henderson caught up with
Captain Medina's unit. He told 30 or 40 of the men that from the reports
he had received, some civilians might have been killed-perhaps needlessly. The Colonel pointed out that this overshadowed to a degree any
success they had achieved in the operation. It concerned him as brigade
commander, for he did not expect his soldiers to kill civilians. He asked
whether anyone in the group had observed shooting or killing of civilians.
Reportedly there was a general negative reply. Then the commander pointed his finger at random to three or four men in turn, asking them the same
question. The answer "No, sir," came back, loud and clear. 50
46id., December I1, 1969, 1. See also December 1, 19, 1.
47
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Eyewitness A ccounts
Michael Bernhardt, a rifleman, claims that he did not fire his weapon at
all, but kept it slung on his shoulder with the muzzle pointing to the ground.
He insists that Captain Medina was explicit and matter of fact during the
briefing. To Bernhardt there was no doubt: "The village and its inhabitants
would be destroyed." However, he forgot what ended the shooting, but
recalls that it lasted for thirty minutes. Despite his recall of the time
involved, he could not remember if he took part in the burning of Songmy.
On the other hand, he remembered a soldier who laughed when he pressed
the trigger, and perhaps a dozen men impressed him as having gone
berserk. It was Bernhardt who described the battle to Ronald Ridenhour,
the individual who is credited with causing the investigation to be opened.
This took place in November of 1968, eight months after the incident, and
sixteen months before Ridenhour wrote the Secretary of Defense and
others. 51
Bernhardt, now at Fort Dix, New Jersey, said of the incident:
They would get the people together and gather them in groups. Then they
would shoot them with rifles and machine guns. Going through the village, I
saw a lot of bodies in these things that looked like bomb craters. I actually saw
them 52
shoot some of them. I saw them shoot a group in a ditch, about 20 of
them.
He continued to contradict himself. In one interview he said it took over
half an hour to wipe out the village. In another he said the time was "15 to
20 minutes." After saying that he had seen 20 killed, later in the same
interview he raised this to 100. He then recalled that a body count of over
300 civilians was circulating through the company.
Private Michael Terry told Seymour Hersh of the London Times:
They just marched through, shooting everybody. Seems like no one said
anything-they just started pulling people out and shooting them. They had
them in a group standing over a ditch ... one officer ordered a kid to machine-gun everybody down, but the kid just couldn't do it. He threw the
machine-gun down and the officer picked it up. I don't remember seeing any
men in the ditch. Mostly women and
kids. Some of them were still breath53
ing-they were pretty bad shot up.
Terry said that he thought the officers actually did not know whether they
were ordered to kill the villagers or not. He mentioned that a lot of the men
feel that the South Vietnamese civilians are something less than human.
'54
"We just treated them like animals."
51
New
52

York Times Magazine, December 14, 1969, 110-116.
New York Times, November 20, 1969, 1.
53
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Leon Stevenson, interviewed by telephone from his home in Montana,
stated:
I saw some bodies too, but there were very few where I was, 15 to 20 at the
most ... there was a lot of shooting from the time we got there. The gunships
we went in. There was like a miniature war going on. 55

were firing when

Stevenson said that it was difficult for him to determine whether all the
firing emanated from the invasion force or whether it represented return
fire from the village. He indicated that Medina had not given instructions
that civilians be killed. On the other hand, he questioned the innocence of
victims, saying, "over there you have to be on one side or the other."
James R. Bergthold of Niagara Falls told of the incident:
We were briefed the night before and were told we were going into an area
controlled by the Vietcong for about four years. The captain told us-we
weren't given any orders to shoot-that if we saw anyone they might be
carrying weapons, so be careful. 56
Former Army photographer Ronald L. Haeberle told Joseph Eszterhas
of the Cleveland Plain Dealer he saw "as many as 30 American soldiers
murder as many as 100 South Vietnamese civilians, many of them women
and babies, many left in lifeless clumps."

57

In a telephone interview, William F. Doherty of Boston said that he saw
the bodies of "probably more than 100" villagers when his platoon passed
through the village during the operation. He said the dead included women
and children. He added:
The captain told us in the briefing they were all either North Vietnamese
Army, Vietcong, or Vietcong sympathizers. We were told it was clear of
everybody (else) ....
58

The Saigon government had this to say:
This hamlet was organized by the Communists into a good combat hamlet with
good communications and an underground system. The population of the
hamlet was forced by the Communists to stay in their places. Task Force
Barker met strong resistance ....59
Paul Meadlo of Terre Haute said that he killed 35 to 40 men, women
and children during the attack. Why?
Because I felt like I was ordered to do it ...(and) I felt like I was doing the
60
right thing, because I lost buddies ... and it was on my conscience.

Asked how many persons he had killed in the first group of villagers
55
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rounded up, Meadlo said, "I'd say about 15." The second group was "70
to 75 people," and he added, "I must have killed about a third of this." 61
A resident of the village, Do Hoai, said that although the area had been
largely under Vietcong control, the villagers bore no arms and had engaged
in no hostile action against the Americans. He said the inhabitants were
first ordered out of their homes. When the houses had been cleared, the
troops dynamited those made of brick and set fire to the wooden structures. Then he said the Vietnamese were gunned down where they stood.
He said about 20 soldiers performed the executions. The only people to
escape, according to Mr. Do Hoai, were those who had hidden under the
62
bodies of victims until the Americans left.
Instructions: War Crimes-The Laws of War
Military headquarters in Saigon issued a detailed five-page directive in
1967 on the rules of warfare. It required every soldier witnessing or even
hearing of a possible war crime to inform his commanding officer without
delay. The penalty for not doing so was specified as two years at hard labor
and a dishonorable discharge. Issued on April 27, 1967, the order specifies
that all officers and enlisted men are supposed to be briefed on its requirements when they first report for duty in Vietnam. It cites as a grave breach
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the killing, torturing or injuring of "persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms." The directive said:
Persons discovering war crimes will take all reasonable action under the
circumstances to preserve physical evidence, to note identity of witnesses
present, and to record (by photograph, sketch, or descriptive notes) the circumstances and surroundings. 63
Although it stressed that all soldiers should make an effort to detect and
report war crimes, it appealed especially to those in contact with the
enemy-and to personnel with intelligence, police, photographic or medical
assignments.
The "Peers Report"
Lieutenant General William R. Peers, after a three-month inquiry, produced a 225-page report on the Songmy incident. A heavily censored
version was released to the news media. The panel which Peers headed
heard 20,000 pages of testimony, and actually visited the Songmy area.
8
11d.,
62
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93New York Times, December 14, 1969, p. 1. Reference is made to Directive 20-4,
April 27, 1967. For a later Directive see Directive Number 27-5, November 2, 1967, issued
by United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in AM. J. INT'L. L. LXII (July,
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The report confirmed that Colonel Barker had told his subordinates that
the village would be free except for Vietcong and sympathizers. However,
it spoke of a revenge element injected into a later briefing by a
lower-ranking officer.
In narrative fashion, the story is told of how American soldiers killed the
civilians in three groups. One of these was taken to a trench before they
were shot. The incident was apparently witnessed by American pilots and
by ground soldiers and Vietnamese. Some witnesses had reported the
happenings to their superiors. These reports then made their way up the
chain of command. According to Peers, as they were passed from one link
of the chain to the next, they were softened or diluted. By the time they
reached the division level, it appeared that only 20-28 Vietnamese had
been killed, and no further report was made.6 4
As a result of the Peers inquiry, fourteen officers ranking from Major
General down to Captain have been charged with commission of varying
offenses. Included in this group are the American Division Commander, his
assistant, and the chief of staff.65 Most are charged with dereliction and
failure to obey lawful regulations. These, of course, are in addition to
several others charged earlier, whose offenses range from premeditated
murder to rape and assault.
Comments and Conclusions
Rules of warfare are based upon a certain degree of utility to the
opposing forces. 6 6 When the belligerents are state vs. state, the meaning
may be rather straightforward. For example, State "A" subscribes to
humane interpretations of the customs and rules of war. Since State "B"
has confidence in the knowledge that State "A" does actually follow this
code, so will she. This seems simple enough, but is this practical in a war of
the type being fought in Vietnam?
Without getting too involved in the difference between societies, between states that do and do not subscribe to humane principles, one must
look at the war itself. War to the soldier facing the enemy is vastly different
from the image of war to everyone else. The soldier is most concerned with
survival. For that reason, what is legal varies directly in relation to what
contributes to survival. In this framework, the rules of warfare are of use
only to the extent that they fit the objective-survival. The military unit is,
"New York Times, March 27, 1970, pp. 1, 4. See also "The Generals Accused,"
Newsweek, March 30, 1970, pp. 18-20.
65Major General Samuel W. Koster was commander of the Americal Division. Brigadier
General George Young was his assistant. Colonel Nels A. Parson, Jr., was chief of staff. All
have been accused of failure to obey lawful regulations and dereliction of duty.
66H. B. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXT (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press,
1968).
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after all, composed of individuals all of whom have the desire to survive.
The group therefore can change the rules to fit the objective.
It is possible that higher authority is forced by circumstance tacitly to
approve survival tactics. The small unit is cohesive, and much depends
upon the individual performing "his part." When the individual has to
subscribe to extreme measures to insure his own continued existence, the
unit itself must approve. This is obvious, because unit survival depends
upon teamwork. This argument could be projected upward along the chain
of command. It calls for no great amount of logic to understand that an
Army Division can only be as successful as its component squads and
platoons.
Alexander and Scipio operated under different rules from those of today.
Their tactics called for all resistance to be crushed. After that, they would
be humane. Where is the elusive line between humane and inhumane? One
could reply that it is simply the difference between killing women and
children and not killing them. Yet, for women and children to be killed by
aircraft dropping bombs on them is not disapproved. The difference is not
easy to resolve. Certainly, it can be argued that to kill women and children
is abhorrent-no matter how it is done. The tendency, however, is to
over-simplify or base conclusions on insufficient evidence, or refuse to look
at the overall picture.
As to the Songmy affair itself, it is quite possible that in the heat of battle
an individual may become mentally deranged. Crimes are committed in this
country every minute of the day by so called "normal" people. Actually,
mental illness is one of the nation's biggest problems. Compound the two
and there is no limit to where the imagination can lead. To blame whatever
happened at Songmy on mental illness, temporary insanity, poor judgment
or whatever, would again be to oversimplify the problem. The solution lies
elsewhere-if indeed, there is such a solution.
The individual in Vietnam is thrust into a situation in which he is forced
to fight a "back-alley brawl" and is expected to obey the "Marquis of
Queensbury" rules. If he follows the rules he is told to follow, his chance
of losing his own life is greatly enhanced. If he fights to survive, the image
taken home by the "network rep" may be that he is a horrible monster.
Can this conflict between the real and the apparent be reconciled? In the
present set of circumstances it is doubtful. The group-the combat
team-approves of survival. They like it. To live long enough to return
home in one piece is an objective with which few can find rational fault. Is
it any wonder then, that, under such conditions, "inhumanity may turn into
custom?"
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